Almost from the crisis's onset, there was little chance of a peaceful settlement because in December Mussolini
decided on war as the best way to destroy Ethiopia's potential threat. In his
opinion, Italy would have to act before mid- 1937, when Germany would have
regained sufficient strength to take the initiative in Europe. First, however,
Italy had to seek France's neutrality in any adventure in the Horn of Africa.
During the past few years, Paris had been signaling its willingness to
negotiate about Ethiopia. There had been some preliminary discussions and
agreement in principle, which permitted Premier Pierre Laval and Mussolini to
conclude a formal pact on 7 January 1935 that conceded France's disinterest in
Ethiopia -- the free hand long sought by the Italians -- for abandonment
of Rome's rights over its subjects in Tunisia and an ephemeral military
alliance in case Hitler moved against Austria. As of January 1935, none of the
other powers, whether alone or united, could have stopped Italy from its war in
Ethiopia. Most observers, however, did not foresee that eventuality, since they
reasoned that Ethiopia would make concessions rather than fight a major
European power. They were not only ignorant of Ethiopia's historic refusal to
abandon its independence but they also were mostly racists who considered
blacks incompetent and irresponsible. They did not reckon on the steel spine of
Haile Sellassie and his compatriots' deeply entrenched anti-Italian attitudes.
Rome, meanwhile, was calling up troops and otherwise preparing for war, while
simultaneously proclaiming its peaceful intentions. In Addis Abeba, the emperor
resisted the mounting evidence: he had neither sufficient money, weapons, nor
enough trained troops to contain a modern force. True, he could call up a
traditional Ethiopian levy of five hundred thousand men, but such a
mobilization was, the emperor knew, an act of defeat. He could no longer rely
on France, which in March 1935 had barred transshipment of war materiel from
Djibouti, contrary to all relevant treaties. His only option was to continue to
trust the league's promise of collective security.
In Geneva, the Ethiopians charged that Italy was using a small incident as a
pretext for war. Rome stonewalled all accusations and, as a matter of policy,
lied, dissimulated, and repeatedly sought to postpone all debate. Slowly, the
Ethiopian government came to realize that the Italians would use the league's
time-consuming procedures as a convenient blind to prepare for war. To say that
the league was working against Ethiopia's interests would be generous. The
council's major powers tried to force humiliating concessions on Ethiopia so
that an appeased Italy might then serve the needs of continental politics.
Neither France nor Britain understood that to accommodate Mussolini beyond a
certain point would destroy the league's credibility, the plausibility of
collective security, and the European balance of power.
The ruin became obvious at a meeting in Stresa in April 1935. The conference
had two objectives: to return Germany to legitimacy and to demonstrate the
solidarity of Britain, Italy, and France in European matters. Stresa was
blithely unconcerned with the world's nooks and crannies, or even with the
developing crisis in the Horn of Africa, to Mussolini's considerable surprise.
The Italian twice asked whether the final statement about collective security
and the inviolability of treaties applied solely to Europe. The silence signaled
that Italy could go to war with its European rear covered, permitting Rome to
become more bellicose in May, when the major powers banned arms sales to the
belligerents, a measure that hurt only Ethiopia.
